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The following is a chronological list of opinions issued by the U.S. District Court for the District of California [N.D.] that involve or touch on some aspect of computer forensics. Every effort is being made to locate relevant decisions; however, this list is intended as a research aid only, and should not be considered definitive. If you have any suggestions for decisions that should be added to this list, please email them to me using the contact form.
Reminder: These case digests are provided for informational purposes only, and do not constitute legal advice. Anyone conducting legal research on a particular topic or in a specific jurisdiction is advised to supplement these materials with their own efforts or those of a qualified attorney whom they have hired for that purpose.
2011
United States v. Hill, No. CR 10-00261 JSW (N.D. Calif. 1-10-2011) -- Motion to Suppress Denied in Part and Granted in Part -- Defendant was charged with "two counts of production of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a), one count of receipt of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2), and one count of possession of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B)." The charges stemmed from an investigation into a report that a man driving a white SUV had exposed himself to a young girl near the Dixie Elementary School in San Rafael, California. On their way to interview the victim, officers saw a white SUV approaching them. According to police, the car lacked a front license plate and the driver seemed to be purposefully avoiding eye contact. The officers stopped the vehicle. During the stop, one officer noticed the car had lots of fishing-related stickers, and he recalled an earlier report of attempted luring of young girls who described a similar white vehicle. The officer asked that the victim be brought to the car to see if she could identify the driver. The victim positively identified the driver and he was placed under arrest. During a search of defendant, officers located an iPhone and immediately began searching it. The phone contained images of a young girl exposing herself to defendant and vice versa. Back at the station, officers also discovered videos of the same girl and defendant on the iPhone. Based on those images and videos, officers applied for and received search warrants for defendant's residences, his iPhone, iPod, and other computer media. A week later, officers conducted an inventory search of defendant's vehicle and located an iPod in the center console. Officers reviewed the iPod and found over 400 pornographic images. Among other things, defendant moved to suppress the evidence found through the warrantless searches of his iPhone and the iPod, arguing that they were unconstitutional. The government defended the searches, arguing that the inspection of the iPhone was incident to a valid arrest and that the inspection of the iPod was part of routine inventory search of defendant's vehicle. The District Court concluded, just as the California Supreme Court did in People v. Diaz, 2011 WL 6158 (Cal. Jan. 3, 2011), that the search of defendant's iPhone was justified under current U.S. Supreme Court doctrine. Specifically, the Court cited Robinson, United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974), in which the Court held that during a lawful arrest, police may search the arrestee and the area within the control of the arrestee without a warrant. The issue, the Court said, is whether a cell phone is an object that is "part of the person" or merely "within an arrestee's immediate control." The District Court elected to follow Diaz and held that absent a contrary ruling by the Ninth Circuit or the U.S. Supreme Court, a cell phone found on an arrestee's person can be search as part of a valid arrest. (The Court's ruling suggests that if the cell phone is not being carried in the arrestee's clothing, this exception might not apply.) Defendant's motion to suppress was denied. As for the iPod, the Court noted that the government provided no information regarding the standard procedures used to conduct inventory searches, and thus the Court could not conclude that the search was justified. The government also argued that the evidence was admissible under the "inevitable discovery" doctrine, but again, absent evidence of the standard procedures used to search the vehicle, there was no way for the Court to conclude that the iPod's discovery was in fact inevitable. The motion to suppress the iPod evidence was granted.
United States v. Hernandez, No. CR 08-0730 WHA (N.D. Calif. 1-6-2011) -- Motion to Suppress Granted -- San Francisco police officers observed three men whom they believed to be members of the MS-13 gang standing in front of a restaurant. A no-loitering sign was posted in the restaurant window. The officers watched the men for a few minutes, but observed no threatening or gang-related behavior. The officers approached the men to advise them about the no-loitering policy, and despite the lack of any threatening behavior, conducted a pat-down search of each one. During the frisk, a kitchen knife was discovered in the pocket of the defendant, and he was arrested for carrying a concealed weapon. Police also seized a photo, camera, micro-card adapter, and two cell-phones from the defendant. At the police station, officers reviewed the contents of both phones. Based in part on the information found in the cell phones, an application was filed for a search warrant for the defendant's home, where additional evidence was located. Defendant filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the warrantless search was unlawful. The District Court agreed with defendant that there was no reasonable suspicion that defendant was engaged in criminal activity or was about to commit a crime. The police officer argued that the young men were loitering, but the court noted that the ordinance applies only to private property, not a public sidewalk. The court also noted that the officer who frisked defendant had no reason to believe that the defendant posed any specific threat to the officer or his fellow patrolmen. Since there was no reasonable basis for the stop and frisk, all evidence seized from defendant and subsequently from his home was suppressed. The court specifically rejected application of the two most common exceptions to the exclusionary rule, the good-faith test under Leon and the inevitable discovery doctrine. Leon doesn't apply, the court said, when a warrant is obtained "on the basis of unlawfully seized evidence." Similarly, the court concluded that further discovery of the contents of the phones and defendant's home was not "inevitable" because the government failed to show what probable cause would have led to the discovery. Defendant's motion to suppress was granted.
2010
U.S. v. Tosti, No. C 09-00973-1 JSW (N.D. Cal. 7-12-2010) -- Defendant brought computer to CompUSA for repair. Technician discovered child pornography and contacted local police. A warrant was issued for defendant's home and he was indicted for possession of child pornography based on items found during the search. Defendant filed a motion for production of documents from the FBI seeking "any and all records" relating to the FBI's contact with CompUSA and its employees throughout the United States for a period of approximately two years. The Government moved to quash the subpoena and the district court agreed, saying that defendant's motion had failed to satisfy the factors enunicated by the Supreme Court in U.S. v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). In particularly, the court said, the defendant failed to show that the requested documents would be relevant and on its face, the subpoena was overly broad.
U.S. v. Hanson, No. CR 09-00946 JSW (N.D. Cal. 6-2-2010) — Defendant flew into San Francisco Airport from Seoul, South Korea, and was randomly selected for enhanced baggage examination. A Customs Officer observered that defendant was displaying notable signs of nervousness; the inspection of his luggage revealed condoms and male-enhancement pills. Defendant voluntarily informed the Customs Officer that he taught English to Korean children ages five and up. Based on those facts, the Customs Officer asked to conduct a review of defendant's electronic media. During that review, the Customs Officer observed an image of a naked adolescent female, although she could not precisely estimate the child's age. The Customs Officer was also unable to identify the image that triggered her suspicion at a later date. Upon seeing the image, the Customs Officer seized defendant's laptop. A Customs computer forensic technician removed the hard drive at a Customs laboratory and did a preliminary scan, finding two folders containing possible child pornography. A search four months later found over 1,000 images of child pornography. All of the searches were warrantless, and defendant moved to suppress. The Court noted that international border searches do not require "a warrant, probable cause, nor even articulable suspicion," so the initial search by the Customs Officer was permissible. But the Court disagreed that the discovery of one possibly contraband image was sufficient to overcome defendant's right of privacy in his laptop. Thus, the subsequent warrantless searches were unconstitutional absent a recognized exception. The Court concluded that the first search, conducted less than ten days after the seizure of the laptop, fell within the category of an "extended border search," which merely requires a showing of "reasonable suspicion." In this case, the Court said, the Customs Officer had reasonable suspicion that the laptop contained contraband, looking at the facts as a whole. The subsequent search, however, was too remote in time to be considered part of the extended border search, and so required a warrant. Defendant's motion to suppress was denied as to the fruits of the first laboratory search, and granted as to the second.
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